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56Section I:  The Cost-Benefit Analysis of
                  the Czech-Slovak                   
          Exchange-Rate System 
1.  Introduction
After The Velvet revolution in 1989, Czechoslovakia has proved that "A Velvet divorce"
is also possible. The problem of  the exchange-rate system between newly established the Czech
and Slovak Republics has become one of the key issues in defining the Czech-Slovak
relationships.
In October 1992, The Monetary Arrangement was signed between the Czech and Slovak
Republics establishing The Czech-Slovak Currency Union. The life of the new union was not
very long. Starting its existence in January 1993, it collapsed in February and was replaced by a
clearing union (a multiple-rate system with two currencies using a clearing mechanism with the
original clearing rate of one to one). 
Other systems suggested by economic experts as alternative solutions or modifications
differ in a degree of fixity of an exchange-rate as well as in a degree of a convertibility
significantly. On the one hand, a fixed exchange-rate regime and a floating exchange-rate regime
appear among suggested systems. On the other hand, a regime of direct payments (in ECU) is
also being discussed.
7In the first section (The Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Czech-Slovak Exchange-Rate
System), this paper attempts to show that  an exchange-rate system based on a fixed rate would
be too costly for both republics and that modifications should move the present system toward a
greater flexibility. The second section (Modifying Present System) suggests how the present
system should be reformed further. It attempts to classify circumstances under which a regime of
direct payments  would become a superior solution to a clearing union. 
The cost-benefit analysis allows us to show the problem in a comprehensive way and to
consider all main factors including those which are difficult to express in any model. Moreover,
in this framework, it is possible to describe the evolution of the exchange-rate system and
consequent changes in the cost-benefit structure.
The choice of the best possible combination of fixity and flexibility of an exchange-rate
system is often linked with the concept of optimum currency areas. Also, the fact that the
evolution of the Czech-Slovak exchange-rate system started from a currency union suggests that
the theory of optimum currency areas and the theory of coordination of interdependent
economies provide a useful theoretical framework for our analysis. 
However, both theories have mainly been developed for analyzing the process of
integration. The facts that the Czech and Slovak Republics are going in the opposite direction
and, in addition, both countries are in a transition process toward market economies, change the
dimension of our analysis in some respects. Specifically, the weight of some costs and benefits in
the structure may differ from this in the "integration" approach and potential benefits may not
be realized.
According to the structure suggested in the analysis of Ishiyama (1978) and Taylor &
Masson (1992), members of a currency union gain common currency, an integrated financial
market, economic and political integration as the main benefits of the union. 
On the other hand, the members of a currency union also bear the following costs: loss
of national sovereignty, loss of independent monetary policy, limited fiscal policy, loss of
seigniorage revenues and loss of exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism.
Benefits and costs are of different importance in the structure. The weight of benefits is
increased by a high degree of interdependence among the currency union members. The costs
increase, the more difficult it is to coordinate monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies. 
Ishiyama (1978) and Taylor & Masson (1992) proposed that loss of monetary, fiscal and
exchange-rate policy independence is unacceptable if there is a lot of permanent asymmetries
within the union. 
8Eichengreen (1990) shows that economic convergence is a key issue for existence of a
monetary union. The asymmetric problems call for different policy responses. However, the
main economic tools are not independent within the union, and any accepted common strategy
can not solve these problems fully.
The effectiveness of other adjustment mechanisms that could reduce differences is
another important factor entering analysis. Taylor & Masson (1992) and  Willet & Tower(1970)
suggest to look at the adjustment mechanisms that are available to union members to cushion
economic imbalances. The weaker these adjustment mechanisms are the more important the loss
of main economic tools becomes.
Ishiyama (1978) classifies the adjustment mechanisms available for union members as
follows: labour mobility, capital mobility and nominal price and income flexibility. High factor
mobility and high downward price flexibility reduce costs of a currency union by solving regional
problems and by decreasing asymmetries in a system. Ishiyama also emphasizes that while the
costs are clearly visible, benefits are of a more abstract nature.
The costs of policy harmonization may be increased by the absence of the federal fiscal
transfer system proposed by Taylor & Masson (1992) as a key absorption mechanism. Although
transfers do not function as an adjustment mechanism, they reduce costs of asymmetric shocks
in a currency union. 
As we said before, it is important to link the above suggested structure with the
Czech-Slovak economic context. The cost-benefit analysis of evolution of the exchange-rate
system is organized as follows.
Firstly, after providing a brief description, the costs and benefits of the Czech-Slovak
currency union are analyzed (how they were affected by the split of CSFR, transition and to what
extent they were realized). Subsequently, the costs and benefits are weighed. 
Summing up the above-listed theories, following factors provide framework for
weighting costs of the union: asymmetries in the system, economic divergence, adjustment
mechanisms and absence of fiscal transfer system.
The weight of benefits depends on the degree of real integration and on the
characteristics of a union currency. We add three specific factors to the level of interdependence
to get list of factors affecting benefits: transition, split of CSFR and temporality of the union.
Secondly, after describing the Czech-Slovak clearing union, the changes in the
cost-benefit structure are considered to analyze what has been lost by the movement toward the
present system and what has been gained. Ishiyama (1978) argues that the benefits of a currency
union connected with a common currency are not realized in a system with two currencies.
9Governments are not able to maintain a stable exchange rate for long maturities as they are with
one currency. Consequently, there is an increase in uncertainty and instability in the system.
Similarly, other benefits of the currency union may not be fully realized in the clearing union. 
The same approach is used to describe the changes in the cost structure. To what extent
has the necessity to harmonize monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policy been reduced? Does
the present system provide some new mechanisms to cushion asymmetric problems? We will
identify conditions under which the costs of the clearing union would be reduced using history
of the Kc/Sk
1 exchange rate as an evidence supporting our analysis. 
Analogously to analysis of Willet & Tower (1970) who linked their discussion of
optimum currency areas with the choice between fixed and flexible exchange rates, we will use
results of the cost-benefit analysis to decide whether the fixed Kc/Sk rate would provide stability
for the Czech-Slovak transactions keeping in mind that the costs of policy coordination
exceeded benefits of the currency union. 
Although historical and economical interdependence of both republics, their size and EC
orientation support the idea of a fixed exchange rate, our analysis suggests that using a flexible
system appears to be more realistic solution since policy coordination necessary for achieving a
stable exchange rate would be extremely costly for the Czech and Slovak Republics.
1 Sk refers to the Slovak crown. Kc refers to the Czech crown.
102.  The Czech-Slovak Currency Union
It is worth noting that the Czech-Slovak Currency Union "inherited" the cost-benefit
structure from the former Czechoslovakia and this structure was influenced by the split of
Czechoslovakia. As the fate of the arrangement suggests, the costs of the currency union
outweighed the benefits. With costs already high, we will see that the potential benefits of a
currency union were reduced by temporality of the union, by transition problems as well as by
the split of CSFR
2. 
2. 1.  Description
After the split of Czechoslovakia in December 1992, The Czech-Slovak Currency Union
lasted for six weeks (1. 1. 1993 - 8. 2. 1993). In January, SBCS (the central bank of the former
Czechoslovakia) was divided into two central banks: CNB (Czech National Bank) and NBS
(National Bank of Slovakia). These two banks established The Monetary Council in order to
negotiate common monetary and exchange-rate policies as well as reserve requirements. 
The Monetary Arrangement between the Czech and Slovak Republics from 29. 10. 1992
itself signalled temporality of the union. This can be concluded from the four escape clauses any
of which would allow for either  member to abandon the union. The union could be abandoned
if the republic deficit of one of the members exceeded 10 % of annual republic revenues; the fall
in foreign reserves of one of the central banks exceeded the value of that month's import in
convertible currencies; speculative capital flows from one republic to the other exceeded 5 % of
total bank deposits; The Monetary Council could not agree on a common monetary policy. 
2. 2.  Benefits of Currency Union
2. 2. a.  Common currency
The Czech-Slovak Currency Union used as its common currency the Czechoslovak
crown (Kcs) - the medium of exchange of the Czechoslovak state with long history of seventy
years. This inheritance allowed for the new states to use a well-established currency, and to avoid
the costs of a currency unification process. 
Transaction costs were not increased. In both republics, neither private nor legal persons
needed to exchange domestic currency in order to trade with or travel in the other republic.
2 Since the potential benefits of a currency union were reduced significantly by
economic and political constraints, the first Czech-Slovak exchange-rate system may even not
be considered as a currency union, according to a standard definition.
11The inherited currency was characterized by  stability and a high anti-inflationary
credibility as a result of CSFR authorities' policy since 1990. The Czechoslovak crown had not
been devalued for three years. SBCS had been an independent central bank with a high aversion
to inflation. Prices were stable in both republics of the former Czechoslovakia. Figures I.1. and
I.2. show that the only big inflation sources were the 1990 price liberalization and the 1993 tax
reform. 




























































Data Source: FSU (Federal Statistical Office of Czechoslovakia), CSU
(Czech Statistical Office).



























































                   Data source: FSU, SSU ( Slovak Statistical Office).
12The stability of the Czechoslovak crown had been supported by the fact that the
Czechoslovak government had managed to balance its budget. The Czechoslovak deficit had not
been higher than 2 % of GNP (See Table I.1.) since 1989. As a result, the currency union could
expect a low output-inflation trade-off caused by low inflationary expectations of union residents
and high credibility of The Monetary Council. 
 





 1989         6,414        0.85 %
 1990       - 7,156      - 0.88 %
 1991        10,359        1.06 % 
 1992        16,660        1.77 %
 Data source: FSU.
With a common  currency, the exchange rate between domestic currencies of union
members did not exist. If the Czechoslovak crown had been expected to last for all maturities,
exchange-rate uncertainty would have been reduced to zero.  Speculative capital flows could not
worsen the exchange-rate imbalances between the republics. Also, no information searching was
necessary to determine an appropriate exchange rate. Neither CNB nor NBS needed to hold
reserves denominated in the other union member's currency.
2. 2. b.  Integrated Financial Market
Due to the transition process, the currency union lacked well-developed financial
markets in either member country. However, there was a possibility to develop an integrated
financial market using inherited traditions. With a common currency, redistributing savings and
investment through the banking system would make it easier to allocate financial resources
within the union optimally.
There was a tendency towards portfolio diversification within the union.  Residents
could freely choose where to deposit their savings. Also, during the first wave of voucher
privatization they were allowed to bid for shares from both republics without any restrictions.
Czech residents became owners of shares of Slovak enterprises and vice versa.
132. 2 .c.  Economic Integration
The Czech and Slovak Republics have been linked economically (in the Czechoslovak
state) since 1918. There were no trade barriers between republics and the degree of
interdependence was high. 
From table I.2. it is clear that  large trade volumes were exchanged between the Czech
and Slovak Republics in 1992. 
Table I.2.  Czech-Slovak Trade in 1992 
1,992 CR SR
 Import (mil. Kcs)     85,500   103,600
 % of total import     25 %     51 %
 Export (mil. Kcs)   103,600     85,500
 % of total export     31 %     46 %
  Data source: CSU, SSU.
Moreover, 1992 statistics did not record all Czech-Slovak trade transactions because
some intrafirm transactions (Czech-Slovak enterprises) were ignored. 
The Currency Union allowed for both members to operate within a larger, diversified
common market with reduced transaction costs. As a result, both republics gained some
economic stability since external shocks were relatively smaller and internal shocks might offset
each other partially. 
In order to support economic cooperation The Czech-Slovak Customs Union was
established (with no trade barriers between members). The efficiency of economic cooperation
and integration was reduced by the fact that  both economies have relatively large state sectors
built during the previous regime. The state sector industries were not developed with respect to
comparative advantages of regions. 
One implication that follows is that the interdependence is "artificial" in some respects
since it was planned by the previous regime. 
2. 2. d.  Political Integration
The Czech-Slovak Currency Union signalled willingness of both members to coordinate
their policies. Therefore, political stability in the area was assured.  However, the split of CSFR
was preceded by the collapse of federal institutions. No federal institution with re-distributive
power was established as a part of the new union system. Republic budgets were strictly
14separated except for transfers from the asset-division process. Within the union there was no
instrument for helping a depressed republic if necessary (international loans only). The only
supranational institutions were The Monetary Council and The Council of Customs Union.
 
2. 3.  Costs of Currency Union
2. 3. a.  Loss of National Sovereignty
The transition period has been characterized by a fall in output, price liberalization and a
decrease in the standard of living. All of these problems are politically very sensitive, especially in
the most depressed Slovak regions. Any compromise, even if necessary for policy coordination,
is unpopular. 
Before January 1993, federal institutions were responsible for the economic performance
of CSFR. The previous regime's investment in Slovakia had been extremely large and inefficient.
Transfers from the Czech Republic were an important source of revenues for Slovakia. During
the transition period, the Czech Republic was not able to continue with large money transfers to
maintain the level of investment, and to cushion transition shocks.
Together with the fact that an independent Slovak state prospered during World War II
(1939 - 1945), these were reasons for Slovak desire for independence (and of the split of
Czechoslovakia partially). However, within the currency union, the loss of national sovereignty
did not influence the system significantly. 
 
2. 3. b.  Monetary Policy is not Independent
Ishiyama (1978) shows that since the central bank fails to achieve a simultaneous
solution to the problems of unemployment and inflation, members of a currency union have to
decide what should be prioritized. The final decision depends on members' preferences, the size
of depressed regions and the fiscal transfer system. Ishiyama also suggests that if one member
has a higher anti-inflationary credibility, it becomes an leader forcing others to accept
anti-inflationary policy biases.
With only two players on the scene, where the Czech Republic could be marked as a
leader, Slovakia was made worse off when no fiscal transfers took place. The Monetary Council
preferred to maintain a low inflation level and the Kcs/ECU exchange rate that had been fixed
in 1990. CNB could be marked as a leader for two reasons. First, CNB inherited the know-how
of the SBCS. Second, the economic situation of the Czech Republic allowed it to maintain a low
inflation level with lower costs. As a result, economic problems of Slovakia, enlarged by an
absence of the fiscal transfer system, could not be solved through monetary policy.
152. 3. c.  Fiscal Policy is Limited
Taylor & Masson (1992) show that in a currency union fiscal policy becomes a very
important tool for republic governments since monetary policy can not be used to maintain
internal and external balances. The more different the problems of currency union members are,
the more important fiscal policy becomes.
For example, the Slovak government might like to engage in fiscal expansion to solve an
unemployment problem in order to cushion consequences of The Monetary Council's
anti-inflationary monetary policy for Slovakia. However, Taylor & Masson (1992) point out that
there are some limits to fiscal policy independence within every currency union. It is important
to set limits to the expected deficit in order to prevent debt monetizing and excessive borrowing
by union members. Otherwise common currency destabilization would follow.
Specifically, Slovakia expected to be a "deficit member" of the union lost fiscal policy
tool to some extent since The Monetary Arrangement limited the fiscal policy independence.
The deficit of either member was not permitted to exceed 10 % of annual republic revenues.
(Since in a transition period it is difficult to set limits to government debts, the limit of 10 %
might be an excessive constraint for Slovakia.)
2. 3. d. Loss of Seigniorage Revenues
As a direct consequence of a common monetary policy and limited fiscal policy
independence, both republics had to agree on the mix of sources of governments' revenues
(inflation revenues versus tax revenues). Consequently, Slovakia (as a follower) could not set the
optimal mix of sources which was an important loss after the collapse of the federal fiscal
transfer system. 
2. 3. e.  Loss of Exchange Rate as an Adjustment Mechanism
With a common currency, it was not possible to respond to current and capital account
imbalances between republics by adjusting the Kc/Sk exchange rate. Also, it was not possible for
any member to respond to asymmetric imbalances in balance of payments with a
devaluation/revaluation of a common currency.
  
162. 4.  Weighing the Costs of Currency Union
How difficult was it to harmonize monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies for the
Czech and Slovak Republics? Costs of policy harmonization were increased by the divergence of
the union members' economies. The burdens of the transition process have been shared
unequally by the Czech and Slovak Republics. The difference in the nature of the Czech and
Slovak economies caused asymmetric problems to be large and expected to be permanent.
Consequently, the necessity of different policy responses in the near future has been expected to
increase.
Coordinated monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies could not be used as adjustment
mechanisms for permanent asymmetric problems. Both republics only relied on other
mechanisms, which were not strong enough.  
Moreover, the situation was worsened by three facts. First, the economic divergence was
not reduced by transfers after the fiscal federal system had collapsed. Second, the redistribution
of resources was stopped  suddenly within the currency union. Third, it was always Slovakia who
was "worse than average". 
2. 4. a.  Asymmetries
The different nature of the Czech and Slovak economies was built during the previous
regime. After 1948, the agricultural Slovakia and the industrial Czech Republic were re-oriented
toward heavy industry. Inefficient centrally planned changes of the economic structure  have
originated in different consequences of the transition process for both union members.
Asymmetric diversification and adaptability caused the Czech and Slovak Republics'
needs for policy responses to differ significantly. 
On the one hand, the Czech economy has been more diversified, and it has proved more
adept in absorbing shocks. Also, higher productivity growth has been expected to appear in the
Czech Republic. On the other hand, the less diversified and less adaptable economy of the
Slovak Republic has become more sensitive to the transition problems and to external shocks
(EC recession, collapse of USSR). Consequently, the Slovak Republic has faced a rise in
unemployment and a greater fall in output.
The difference in a diversification level and an industrial structure have resulted in the
openness asymmetry. More open Slovakia (See table I.3.) has become more dependent on
external fluctuations than the Czech Republic.
17Table I.3.  Asymmetry in Openness
1,992 CR SR
 Import (mil. Kcs)      251,968       100,697
 % of GNP        34.11 %         49.85 %
 Export (mil. Kcs)      229,400         98,594
 % of GNP        31.05 %         48.81 %
     Data source: FSU, CSU, SSU.
In addition, the less competitive and more risky Slovak export has been more sensitive to
any fluctuation of foreign demand. Figure I.3. ranks the Czech and Slovak exports into five risk
levels where the first level are low-risk exports to developed countries. The fifth level is
considered to be the most risky (payments are uncertain, contracts are short-term). Asymmetric
export competitiveness and riskiness have made common exchange-rate and commercial policies
problematic.
Figure I.3.  Comparison of Riskiness of CR  and  SR Exports












          Data source: FSU, CSU. 
The costs of coordination were stressed by asymmetry in targets since different
economic problems were reflected in the results of the 1992 elections.  Residents of the Czech
Republic voted for political parties (ODS, ODA, KDU-CSL) supporting the transition toward a
market economy (Figure I.4.). On the contrary, residents of the Slovak Republic voted for
representative of more gradual changes - HZDS and for the socialist (SDL) and nationalistic
(SNS) parties (Figure I.5.). The different political orientation of the governments increased the
costs of coordination further
3.
3 As a result, it is very likely that policy makers in both countries use different
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2. 4. b.  Economic Divergence 
Asymmetric nature of the Czech and Slovak economies has resulted into an economic
divergence signalled by diverging macroeconomic indicators. 
Although GNP has been falling in both the Czech and Slovak Republics (Figure I.6.)
since 1989, the shock caused by this fall was much greater for Slovakia. The large and inefficient
investment of the previous regime caused the created national income to grow faster in Slovakia
than in the Czech Republic (Figure I.7.). 
economic models (schools) to make economic decisions. See Analysis of Frankel J. A. &
Rockett K. (1988) for interesting consequences of this fact on results of policy coordination.










    Data source: FSU, CSU.
Figure I.7.  Different Growth of Created National Income (%)

























































          Data source: FSU.
20Consequently, the expectations of the future output growth and standard of living growth had to
be corrected more significantly in Slovakia. Also, it has became necessary for Slovakia to absorb
a much greater fall in the gross investment than for the Czech Republic (Table I.4.).
Table I.4.  Different Fall of Gross Investment
% change 1,990 1991 1992
 Gross investment  CR     - 12.9     - 13.1      - 0.8
 Gross investment  SR     - 12.9     - 32.3    - 20
   Data source: FSU, Hospodarske Noviny (Economic News).
Similarly, productivity has been falling in both republics due to the transition process.
However, it was higher in the Czech Republic (in 1991, according to Hospodarske Noviny,
GDP per capital in the Czech Republic represented 118 % of GDP per capital in Slovakia).
The Czech Republic has been expected to adapt faster. Therefore the Czech Republic
providing cheap labour with expected fast productivity growth has attracted more foreign
capital. According to the Monetary Report of SBCS (1992), more than 90 % of the total foreign
capital inflow (into the former Czechoslovakia) was flowing into the Czech Republic in 1992.
Asymmetric foreign capital inflow has increased differences between expected  economic
performances of both republics.
The different nature of the Czech and Slovak economies has been most significantly
reflected in the  unemployment rates' divergence.














































































 Data source: CSU, SSU, FSU.
Figure I.8. shows that Slovakia faces a consistently higher unemployment level than the
Czech Republic. Moreover, the increasing difference could only be enlarged by the difference in
the creation of new jobs (Figure I.9.).
Figure I.9.  Difference in  Creation of New Jobs 








































     Data source: CSU, SSU.
Since both republics followed the common transition strategy of the CSFR, their
inflation records are very similar. However, the Slovak price level has consistently been above
the Czech price level (Figure I.10.). 










































































   Data source: CSU, SSU, FSU.
23The budgets of the republic governments were balanced (Tables I.5., I.6. and I.7.) in the former
Czechoslovakia. However, there was a fiscal federal system through which the Czech Republic
transferred part of its revenues into the Slovak Republic. The Czechoslovak State Bank (SBCS)
estimated these transfers to be from ten to fifteen billion
4 crowns per year since 1948. In 1992,
the estimated transfer was about twenty billion crowns. Table I.7. illustrates the importance of
the Czech transfer for the Slovak budget performance. Ceteris paribus, revenues from Slovakia
would not be high enough to cover the Slovak government expenditures.
Table I.5.  Budget Revenues
Revenues (mil. Kcs) CR % of GNP SR % of GNP
 1991 251,187 36.18 % 125,087 44.11 %
 1992 251,380 34.03 % 115,876 57.36 %
            Data source: SBCS, FSU.
Table I.6.  Budget Expenditures
Expenditures
(mil. Kcs)
CR % of GNP SR % of GNP
 1991 259,582 37.39 % 133,430 47.06 %
 1992 253,080 34.26 % 123,809 61.29 %
           Data source: SBCS, FSU.
Table I.7.  Budget Deficits
Deficit  (mil. Kcs) CR % of GNP SR % of GNP
 1991       8,395       1.21 %       8,343       2.94 %
 1992       1,700       0.23 %       7,933       3.93 %
 1992 *     - 3,633     - 0.49 %     20,266     10.03 %
           Data source: SBCS, FSU.
* This is an illustrative calculation - the republic budget performances without the
   Czech transfer. 
It is important to recall that The Czech-Slovak Currency Union did not proceed with the
federal fiscal system. Since January 1993, the Slovak Republic budget performance has been
burdened with a sudden large fall in a capital inflow. Moreover, the federal fiscal system was not
the only redistributive tool within the former Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak financial institutions
4 Billion refers to a thousand of million.
24were redistributing savings in order to balance the gap between the level of savings and the level
of investment in Slovakia (Table I.8. shows savings and credits in Slovakia). Also, the
redistribution of profit within the Czech-Slovak enterprises was possible in the previous regime.
Table I.8.  Lack of Savings in Slovakia
(Billion Kcs) 1991 1992
 Total savings       172.8       188.6
 Total credits       207.1       236
 Difference       - 34.3       - 47.4
Data source: FSU, Hospodarske Noviny.
Therefore the total fall in a capital inflow from the Czech Republic was probably larger
than the federal transfer was.
The size of the budget revenues and expenditures was increasing relatively to GNP in
Slovakia while decreasing in the Czech Republic. To some extent, this tendency was caused by a
different approach to the privatisation and by a different social orientation of the republic
governments. 
2. 4. c.  Adjustment Mechanisms
Lack of independent economic tools caused that solution of asymmetric problems and
reduction of divergence trends relied on other adjustment mechanisms. 
Although unemployment rates differed between the Czech and Slovak Republics
significantly, labour mobility between the republics was not high. A housing problem (a housing
market has not been developed yet), traditions (during the previous regime people did not
change their jobs and places of residence) and structural unemployment problems (skills of
unemployed workers do not match requirements of available job openings and re-qualification
program in Slovakia is not very successful) were causes of low labour mobility.  
In 1992, according to the Federal Statistical Office, only 11,740 people moved from
Slovakia to the Czech Republic and 6,823 from the Czech Republic to Slovakia. This was not
enough to cause unemployment rates to converge.
The tension between monetary and fiscal targets of the two governments was not reduced by a
private capital inflow to depressed regions. Transfers from the Czech Republic were stopped,
25and  foreign private capital inflow was asymmetric. The fact that a large portion of the  private
foreign capital was invested in the Czech republic could only enlarge differences. 
Higher competitiveness of production of depressed regions concentrated in Slovakia
could be gained through real depreciation. Since a nominal devaluation and commercial policies
were not available for Slovakia, competitiveness of the Slovak products depended on a
downward flexibility of nominal prices and wages. However, problems accumulated since 1948
were impossible to solve by deflation in a short period of time. The social orientation of the
Slovak government and the strong position of trade unions implied strong pressure not to lower
wages. 
2. 4. d.  Absence of Fiscal Transfer System
In the Czech-Slovak currency union, the absence of the  transfer system  was sudden and
had asymmetric consequences for the Czech and Slovak Republics. The Czech government was
expected to balance its budget, while the Slovak government was expected to have a large deficit.
The Slovak financial institutions faced a sudden savings-investment gap.
Absence of a transfer system was more important than it would have been in a union
with a well-developed financial market.  It was more difficult to  reduce an asymmetry in the
budget performances by a domestic private capital borrowing.  Also,  there was an asymmetry in
 demand for government bonds.   While the Czech government managed to sell all bonds to
financial institutions, the Slovak government's bonds were sold to NBS. The difference in
interest rates (Table I.9.) documents that demand for the Slovak bonds was smaller than demand
for the Czech bonds. 
Table I.9.  Interest Rates -Government Bonds
government bonds 1992 Interest rates
 Czech emission     7 - 12.5 %
 Slovak emission          16.5 %
   Data source: Hospodarske Noviny
In summary, fiscal and monetary policy coordination was more difficult within the union
than within CSFR since the asymmetry of the system was sharpened by a sudden absence of
fiscal transfers.  
262. 5.  Weighing the Benefits of Currency Union 
Benefits of the union were affected by four factors: a large interdependence of both
republics developed in the period of seventy years, the split of CSFR, a transition period toward
market economies and by the conditional character of The Monetary Arrangement. Last three
factors reduced potential benefits of a currency union significantly. 
Specifically, the  uncertainty was not removed by the split of Czechoslovakia causing the
Czech and Slovak foreign reserves to be unstable,  trade volumes to fall and foreign investors to
wait. Necessary conditions for an existence of a currency union were not fulfilled. The union
lacked well-developed financial markets, a clear and mutually acceptable fiscal transfer system, a
common pool of foreign reserves and willingness to cooperate in the long run.
2. 5. a.  Transition
Transition has revealed many problems which make policy coordination difficult. A lot
of inefficiency in the structure of economy decreased all potential benefits from economic and
political integration. The effectiveness of adjustment mechanisms was reduced. The benefits
from financial market integration were not visible although the first wave of voucher
privatisation and the growth of the private sector would probably have increased their weight in
the future.
2. 5. b.  Interdependence
The interdependence of the union members strongly supported the idea that the union
was beneficial for both of them. Since the Czech and Slovak Republics are open to each other
(the interdependence was built over a period of seventy years) they could gain significantly
through economic and political cooperation.
With a high degree of interdependence, there is a possibility of the transmission of
instabilities on a large scale if no cooperation takes place. Specifically, The Federal Statistical
Office estimated that a 30 % fall in Czech-Slovak trade would cause a 4 % fall in the Czech
GDP and a 8 % fall in the Slovak GDP.
However, we cannot neglect the dynamics of the structure of trading partners. The
Czech-Slovak interdependence was planned, and it did not reflect comparative advantages. After
1989, both countries have become more open toward developed countries, and their trade with
countries in transition has fallen (See figures I.11. and I.12). 
27Figure I.11.  Change in Export Orientation


























      Data source: FSU, CSU, SSU.
Figure I.12.  Change in Import Orientation.































     Data source: FSU, CSU, SSU.
28The gradual change in a structure of trading partners will reduce interdependence
decreasing the possibility of instability transmissions. It is not clear that economically different
countries would obtain more stability by using common strategies than by decreasing inefficient
interdependence.
It is interesting to compare the trade structure of both republics. The Slovak Republic
seems to be oriented toward countries in the transition process more than the Czech Republic  
(Figure I.13).
















































      Data source: FSU, CSU, SSU.
2. 5. c.  Split of CSFR
In the pre-union system (the former Czechoslovakia), the benefits of a currency union
were realized (but limited due to  transition). 
After the split of Czechoslovakia, both members of the currency union were losing them
gradually. The benefits started decreasing in significance when the federal fiscal system collapsed.
It was not possible  for a "just divorced pair" to build a new supranational fiscal system in order
to ease monetary and fiscal policy coordination.  
Any cooperation was complicated by the question of the asset division  between the republics.
The division of Czechoslovak assets has appeared to be a complicated problem. Slovakia
requires a compensation for federal know-how, the Czechoslovak flag and for loss of small
regions after World War II. Also, since Slovak banks lacked liquid assets, they borrowed 24.7
billion Kcs from SBCS in December 1992. 
29The "economic integration" benefit was reduced by the fall in the Czech-Slovak trade
caused by the split of CSFR, expectations of the collapse of the union and by the "VAT" tax
reform (Figures I.14. and I.15. show the fall in imports and exports of the Czech Republic).
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302. 5. d.  Temporality
Temporality of the union affected expectations and, as a result, speculative flows
appeared although they were difficult to allocate within the union. Uncertainty was probably
higher in Slovakia. Private and legal persons expecting a short-lived currency union tried to avoid
possible losses by moving assets from Slovakia to the Czech Republic. In comparison with 1991
purchases, according to The Czechoslovak State Bank, the private purchases of foreign
currencies decreased by 1.3 billion Kcs in the Czech Republic in 1992, and they increased  by 1.1
billion  Kcs in the Slovak Republic.
Moreover, the stability and credibility of common currency was eroded. Both central
banks faced a sharp fall in foreign reserves. The fall of reserves began in November 1992 and it
was not stopped by the split of CSFR. Commercial banks were demanding foreign currency in
large volumes (Figures I.16. and I.17.). 
Figure I.16.  Change in Reserves of SBCS in 1992 (monthly)





















































































Data source: CNB, SBCS. 
31Foreign trade partners affected by uncertainty required immediate settlements ( and
caused a decrease in trade by doing so). Foreign commercial banks were not accepting
Czechoslovak crowns and were selling their crown reserves. Sources of foreign capital inflow
were lost temporarily for both republics.
Figure I.17.  Fall in Reserves of CNB and NBS (Jan-Feb 1993).







































































Data source: CNB, Hospodarske Noviny.
322. 6.  Summary
After the split of CSFR, the currency union provided a time space necessary for an
adjustment. Although a currency union might appear to be the best solution to the problem of
the Czech-Slovak exchange-rate system given their historical and economical interdependence
(common stable currency, no trade barriers, no cultural barriers), their size and EC orientation,  
the union collapsed after six weeks.
A transition toward a market economies, consequences of the split of Czechoslovakia,
temporality of the union and unequally shared burdens of these constraints affected  potential
costs and benefits of a currency union crucially. On the one hand, potential benefits of the
currency union were reduced significantly by economic and political constraints. On the other
hand, costs of the system were increasing since the policy coordination was becoming more and
more difficult. Available  adjustment and absorption mechanisms were weak to outweigh the
increasing need for independent economic tools. 
3.  The Czech-Slovak Clearing Union
In February 1993, the Czech-Slovak currency union was replaced by a clearing union and
the Czech and Slovak currencies were separated. All payments between the republics are
regulated by The Payments Agreement
5. 
The present exchange-rate system has two regimes. First, all transactions of legal and
physical persons belong to the clearing regime. In this regime the Czech and Slovak crowns are
independent and inconvertible currencies. Second, there is a flexible-rate regime for tourist
expenditures. In this regime, the Czech and Slovak crowns are fully convertible. The following
paragraphs provide a more detailed description of both regimes as well as a description of the
four available Kc/Sk exchange rates
6. 
5 The Agreement was valid until December 1993. After December 31, if non member
country abandons the Payments Agreement, it remains valid with three months time of notice.
6 Although the present exchange-rate system between the Czech and Slovak Republics
does not belong among free-convertible regimes, it is analyzed as a multiple-rate system for
following reason. The clearing union allows for domestic residents of either member country
to convert domestic currency at the official compouned exchange rate (through ECU) into the
other member country´s goods. Since this category of goods is not restricted (specifically, it
includes all current transactions), economic agents of both countries consider the clearing
rates (compound from Kc/ECU and Sk/ECU exchange rates) as the exchange rates of Kc/Sk.
333.1.  Description
3. 1. a.  Clearing Payments
A clearing mechanism
7 has been applied to prevent the collapse of the inter-republic
trade and to allow to settle all inter-republic debts without difficulties. CNB and NBS have
established clearing accounts with ECU as a clearing unit, and they have committed themselves
to a maintaining the exchange rate of one ECU to one account ECU  with 5 % bands.
(i)  E2 = E1* (1 + )
The exchange rate E2 is used for the transactions settled through the (standard) clearing
account where E1 = (Kc/ECU)/(Sk/ECU) is a compound exchange rate and (clearing
revaluation/devaluation) belongs to the interval: (-10 %, 10 %). In the future, the Czech export
to Slovakia could be affected by an import tariff  t using  E2 = E1* (1 + )(1 - t).
The clearing mechanism uses a monthly settlement period. The deficit country's
government has to settle any imbalance greater than 130 million ECU in convertible currencies.
It is worth noting which transactions are settled through the clearing mechanism: trade
and services transactions (all transit payments included), financial transfers, capital account
transactions (investment, purchases and sales of assets) and debt serving. Financial transfers is a
category used for social transfers, private transfers (insurance) and the account transfers (Slovak
residents had to transfer their accounts into the Slovak Republic until May 1993). 
Two types of transactions are not settled through the (standard) clearing account. First,
the Czech-Slovak transactions from the period before 8. 2. 1993 are settled through the "old
clearing account" with an account unit XCS  (account crown) allowing to settle the inter-republic
debts at a rate of one to one: 
(ii)  E3 = 1 [Kc/Sk].
The old account deficit is added to the "new" account
8 every three months (the first
summation was made on May 15, 1993).
Second, the re-export transactions are settled directly in convertible currencies. The
export of goods imported from the third country is considered  to be a re-export transaction. It
is a re-export transaction only if the character of the exported goods was not changed (packing,
marking and preservation are not considered to be a change).
(iii)   E1 = (Kc/ECU)/(Sk/ECU) 
7 For an interesting analysis of a multilateral clearing mechanism see paper of Peter
Bofinger in CEPR Discussion Papers (1990, No. 458).
8 The standard clearing account is called the new account in order to emphasize that it
is different from the old account.
34The compound exchange rate E1 is used for re-export transactions and for other
Czech-Slovak transactions settled directly in convertible currencies. In the future, prices of
Slovak import may be affected by an import tariff t using E1 = (Kc/ECU)/(Sk/ECU)(1 - t).
3. 1. b.  National Currencies in Reciprocal Tourism.
According to the Czech-Slovak Payments Agreement, the Czech and Slovak financial
institutions are allowed to trade with both national currencies (among themselves and with
private persons). 
Private persons are allowed to use national currencies for paying tourist expenditures.
Physical persons are allowed to use national currencies to cover their expenses during a business
journey in the relevant country. They can export and import  7,500 Kc (Sk).
Although, an access to the other currency is formally restricted for residents of both
republics by the amount of 7,500 Kc (Sk) daily, financial institutions in Prague are willing to buy
larger amounts of Slovak crowns (up to 20,000 Sk). Also, it is possible to exchange crowns daily
in more than one bank. The only real restriction is a shortage of Slovak crowns in the Czech
banks. Since the Czech banks are not willing to trade crowns with the Slovak  banks, purchases
from private persons are the only source of Slovak crowns for them.
Conversely, Slovak financial institutions demand Czech crowns from Czech financial
institutions at an exchange rate close to the clearing rate without response. Figure I.18. shows
that although the Slovak financial institutions lack Czech crowns, their official exchange rate of
Kc/Sk (E4(Sl)) is higher than that offered by Czech financial institutions (E4(Cz)). 












     Data source: Hospodarske Noviny.
35The uncertainty causes commercial banks to follow the clearing rate (and to trade at
nearly zero volumes) instead of finding a realistic exchange rate of Kc/Sk.
Consequently, since the official floating exchange rate  E4 
(iv) E4  = f (E1 , local supply, local demand)
does not reflect total supply and demand for the Czech and Slovak crowns, it does not provide
information about market relative price of crowns. 
3. 2.  Changes in the  Benefit Structure 
What has been lost by a change of the exchange-rate system and what has been gained?
On the one hand, the new benefits have appeared in the benefit structure - a time gain and a
flexibility of the new system. The time gain is of a temporary nature being reduced by postponed
adjustment consequences continuously.  A flexibility gain will only improve the system if
exploited.
On the other hand, benefits linked with the currency union were reduced further. Not
only has the collapse of the union crossed out the common currency from the list of benefits, it
has also reduced the degree of integration. Uncertainty remains, caused by expected changes in
the system such as restrictions or exchange-rate changes. 
However, changes in the benefit structure have not been as dramatic as they would have
been in the case of a stable currency union since the weight of potential union benefits had
already been reduced by the temporality of the union and by the disintegration process initiated
by the split of Czechoslovakia. 
3. 2. a.  From Common Currency to Two Currencies 
With two currencies, a necessity of a currency exchange has appeared. Private persons
have to exchange currencies when travelling to the other country. Legal and physical persons
have had to learn to deal with a clearing mechanism (and to avoid it). An increase of transaction
costs is an important loss since the inter-republic transactions are of a large scale and impossible
to reduce in the short run. Also, with two currencies, it has become necessary to find what the
appropriate exchange rates of Kc/ECU and Sk/ECU should be. Since changes in the relative
price of the two currencies are expected,  some uncertainty remains in the system.
The existence of two currencies has brought a new asymmetry into the system. The
Slovak and Czech crowns differ in credibility and expected stability. The worse Slovak economic
position has resulted in expectations of devaluation. Since February 1993, CNB has been
36building its foreign reserves permanently. On the contrary, the collapse of the union has not
stopped a fall in the NBS's foreign reserves (See Table I.10.).
Table I.10.  Reserves of  the Czech and Slovak Central Banks
(in million of $)
1993 CNB NBS
 February         690 420
 March       1265 240
 April       1670 142
 May       1993 120
 June       2256 260
    Data source: CNB, Hospodarske Noviny.
Moreover, the existence of two currencies has allowed speculations against the "weaker"
one. The speculative flows between the republics may affect the system since the clearing regime
provides some space for speculations
9. 
 
3. 2. b.  Separation of Financial Markets
The trend of separation of financial markets continues. With two currencies, there are
more barriers to allocation of resources within the Czech-Slovak economic area.
For example, for the next waves of voucher privatisation, residents of both republics are
not allowed to bid for the other republic's shares. It is also not possible for them to deposit their
savings accounts in the other country.
3. 2. c.  Economic Disintegration
The Czech-Slovak Customs Union and the clearing mechanism provide a framework for
the Czech and Slovak Republics to continue economic cooperation.  However, the Czech-Slovak
trade has fallen in the beginning of 1993 significantly.  The size of the fall has been estimated (by
9 Also, there were common coins and bills in the first half of the year 1993 and the
number of falsified bills was increasing. There were common coins (1, 2, 5 and 10 Kcs). The
republics used common bills (10, 20, 50, 100, 500 and 1000 Kcs) where bills higher than 50
Kcs were stamped in both republics. The 20 Kcs and 50 Kcs bills were stamped only in
Slovakia. By removing stamps or by replacing stamps it was possible to "exchange" Slovak
crowns for Czech crowns at a rate of one to one. Also, common coins and bills allowed these
exchanges.
37different institutions) to be from 30 to 50 percent of the 1992 trade volumes. It is worth recalling
that this alone implies at least a 4 % fall of the Czech GDP and an 8 % fall of the Slovak GDP
according to estimates made by the Federal Statistical Office.
The fall of trade volumes is not necessarily a direct consequence of the collapse of the
currency union. Firstly, it has been caused also by the CSFR split, and it may be temporary.
Secondly, the tax reform in January 1993 (VAT) caused trade to increase at the end of 1992 and
to fall in the beginning of 1993. Thirdly, the fall in trade also reflects inefficiency in the structures
of both economies. Finally, the CSFR split has made interfirm debts an international issue. Firms
could not expect the governments to cancel international debts or guarantee the payments. As a
result, the firms have begun to select their trading partners more carefully. 
From the previous paragraph we may infer that the disintegration trend has only been
speeded up by the collapse of the currency union. The inefficiency of economic interdependence
is being reduced and more transparent system will be gained. 
3. 2. d.  Political Disintegration
In the present system there is only one supranational political institutions: The Council
of Customs Union. The process of political disintegration has been continuing since December
1992, and has made any step in the opposite direction (fiscal transfer system) impossible in the
near future.  
3. 2. e.  Time Gain
The present system provides time for the Czech and Slovak Republics to accommodate
the separation shock and the collapse of the currency union. Also, it provides time to find
necessary information to determine appropriate exchange rates.
By using the clearing rate E3, the present system allows the settling of all inter-republic
debts without any complications. Some contracts may not be very clear on the question of in
which currency they were denominated. According to a survey published in May 1993 in
Hospodarske Noviny (Economic News) which included only sixty-three large enterprises, the
net debt of Slovak firms was 1.95 billion Kc. Export and import price stability was gained for the
Czech-Slovak trade temporarily since the original clearing rate maintained the one to one rate.  
3. 2. f.  Flexibility
The advantage of the present system is that a gradual change of the system will not be
difficult. Specifically, there is a possibility to remove capital operations (or other category of
38transactions) from the clearing regime which would prevent large capital flows between the
republics. Also, it is possible to merge both clearing accounts and establish a standard bilateral
clearing system.
393. 3.  Changes in the Cost Structure 
By changing the exchange-rate system, the Czech and Slovak Republics have gained the
possibility to use monetary and fiscal policies more independently. Also, new economic tools are
available for both republics: exchange-rate and commercial policies.
Since factors that made coordination within the currency union extremely difficult were
not removed by a simple change of the exchange-rate system and, moreover, the change of the
system has enlarged asymmetry, the availability of independent economic tools  is an extremely
important gain.
As following analysis suggests the Czech and Slovak authorities have started exploiting
of "independence" gain by adjusting in monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies.
Consequently, with uncoordinated monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies, the pressure on
the clearing rates has been created reducing stability of the present system. 
3. 3. a.  Monetary Policy and Revenues Mix
Under a currency union, both union members had to agree on a common monetary
policy. Now, the Czech and Slovak Republics have gained a limited independence of monetary
policies (limited in a sence that both countries use exchange rates as nominal anchors).
Specifically, it is possible for monetary policies to reflect different output growth rates.
Also, the present system allows for both republics to set different mixes of revenues' sources.
However, with non-coordinated monetary policies, the inflation asymmetry is more likely to
appear. Governments' estimates show that inflation is expected to differ in the Czech and Slovak
Republics (See table I.11.).
Table I.11.  Inflation Asymmetry in 1993 
1993 CR SR
 I-II Q. 11.8 % 13.6 %
 Govt. estimates for 1993 15 - 17 % 30 %
     Data source: CSU, SSU, Hospodarske Noviny.
3. 3. b.  Fiscal Policy 
Fiscal policies are independent since the government budget deficits are not limited by
The Payments Agreement. However, there is some limit to differences in budget performances.
If this limit is exceeded, the asymmetry is increased and transformed further into the system.
Specifically, the higher the Slovak deficit is, the lower is the probability that the government will
40be able to finance it by raising revenues, selling bonds or by borrowing. The monetizing of the
deficit would again increase an inflation asymmetry. 
Table I.12. compares the surplus Czech budget performance with the increasing Slovak
budget deficit. It has been increasing dramatically since January 1993 because of unexpectedly
low revenues and a fiscal overexpansion. With deficit higher than 8 % of the previous year's
GDP, the Slovak budget performance has probably exceeded the above-defined limit. 
Table I.12.  Budget Performances in 1993
(billion of crowns) 
Surpluses Surpluses as % of 1992
GDP
CR SR CR SR
 Jan.     - 2.7     - 1.5     - 0.68 %     - 0.89 %
 Feb.       5.8     - 1.5       1.45 %     - 0.91 %
 March     10.4   - 11       2.60 %     - 6.51 %
 April       5   - 11       1.25 %     - 6.51 %
 June       4.8   - 11.8       1.20 %     - 6.98 %
 July       5.6   - 14.8       1.40 %     - 8.76 %
   Data source: CNB.
Summing up, an asymmetry in the credibility and stability of the Czech and  Slovak
crowns would burden future policy coordination with a different output-inflation trade-off.
3. 3. c.  Exchange Rate and Commercial Policies
The Czech and Slovak Republics have gained new economic tools allowing them to
respond to the balance-of-payments imbalances independently. The Slovak authorities made use
of an exchange-rate policy to solve the overvaluation problem.  
The Czech-Slovak clearing system was established with the original exchange rates:
Kc/ECU = Sk/ECU = Kcs/ECU. While the Kc/ECU exchange rate has been stable since
February 1993, economic indicators suggested that the Slovak crown was overvalued. 
The significant imbalance of the Slovak balance of payments caused the foreign reserves
of NBS to fall sharply in the first half of 1993 although the Slovak government sold out
enterprises (Tobacco industry was sold for 80 million $ and other contracts were announced for
41near future) and received official loans (90 million $ from IMF). The Slovak balance of payments
has not been officially publicized. Nevertheless, the previous analysis indicates what the trends
are on the Slovak current and capital accounts.
In 1992, the Czechoslovak trade balance was in deficit and the Czechoslovak service
balance was in surplus which exceeded the trade deficit (Table I.13.). Most revenues from
tourism and services (80 %) came from the Czech Republic.
Consequently, the service surplus in Slovakia may not be large enough to cover the trade
deficit in the case that the trade tendency has been continuing enlarged by the 1993
overexpansion of the Slovak government. Also, it is possible that demand for Slovak export may
decrease because of a small export competitiveness.
Table I.13.  CSFR's  BOP
( convertible currencies)




 1992 - 44,573 46,746 6,382 1,149 - 10,929 - 3,397
Data source: CNB, SBCS.
42In 1993, the Czech-Slovak trade entered the Slovak balance of payments. Table I.14. suggests
that there is a Slovak trade deficit. As a result, the Czech-Slovak trade has not improved the
Slovak current account balance.
Table I.14.  Czech-Slovak Trade in 1993
(million of crowns)
 1993 Czech Surplus Export Import
 January          1,100      3,400     2,300
 February             600      5,600     5,000
 March             900      7,300     6,400
 April             500       6,100     5,600
 May           - 100      5,700     5,800
 June        - 1,600      4,200     5,800
 Total          1,400    32,300   30,900
     Data source: CSU.
In February 1993, a capital outflow from Slovakia was continuing increased by expected
inflation, restrictions
10 and devaluation.
Neither the clearing revaluation of the Slovak crown nor Slovak government
proclamations were strong enough signals to stop capital outflow. Although the change of the
Slovak tax system (zero tax on foreign currency deposits) intended to attract savings of Slovak
residents deposited abroad, it may increase demand for foreign currencies further.
Within the union, the private capital inflow was concentrated into the Czech Republic.
The 1993 economic performance of Slovakia has not reduced uncertainty. Hence a private
capital inflow has probably not increased greatly. 
The negotiation between the Slovak government and IMF signals that the official
lending is an important source for Slovakia
11. 
10 Different types of restrictions indicated that there was a need for an exchange-rate
adjustment. The Slovak government has announced the 20 % import tariff for some key
products including all consumption goods and agricultural products (which is 40 % of all the
Czech-Slovak trade) but it was postponed several times. The limit for private foreign
exchange has been changed from 7,500 Sk per year (available at any time) into 4,500 Sk
available in the first half of 1993. NBS controlled allocation of foreign exchange. The sales of
foreign currencies to commercial banks in Slovakia were nearly zero in the first quarter of
1993. Foreign investors expect an introduction of additional capital restrictions which would
prevent them from moving interests and profits to their domestic countries and which would
move the Slovak crown toward inconvertibility.
11 The negotiation started in April 1993 (90 million $ loan). Since the 30 % devaluation
of the Slovak crown suggested by IMF was not acceptable for Slovakia, the talk was
concentrated on an import tariff after that. In July, the arrangement was signed followed by
the 10 % devaluation.
43In addition, the Slovak capital account situation has been worsened by an absence of the
capital inflow from The Czech Republic which has increased need for a capital inflow from third
countries. 
On July 16, 1993, the ten percent devaluation of the Slovak crown was announced
signalling that Slovak authorities have started exploiting the newly gained economic tools. 
However, factors lowering the effects of devaluation are present in the Slovak economy.
There is still a lot of uncertainty regarding the Slovak economic strategy since no credible
economic program has been proclaimed. The devaluation not supported by other transition
economic strategies cannot eliminate problems which have burdened the republic during
transition. 
Moreover, the Slovak authorities announced that the scale of devaluation would be
corrected if not appropriate. If devaluation is not of an adequate size then the gains will be
ambiguous. Since devaluation expectations may continue, the system would again be burdened
with all overvaluation consequences. Also, a small nominal devaluation does not imply that the
real devaluation is reached. Hence the Slovak current account balance would not be improved,
and export industries would not become more competitive in this case. 
The Slovak economic performance, especially the budget performance, has raised the
problem of an inflation increase (and devaluation may accelerate inflation also). The current
unemployment and output situation suggests that it may be too costly for Slovakia to reduce
inflation to the lower level. Consequently, the devaluation gain may be eroded rapidly by
significant inflation differential. 
444.  Conclusions
The cost-benefit analysis of the Czech-Slovak exchange-rate system shows that since the
nature of the Czech and Slovak economies differ and the adjustment mechanisms are weak, the
costs of the currency union exceeded benefits which were reduced by economic and political
constraints.
On the one hand, the clearing union, established after the collapse of the currency union,
has sharpened the asymmetry in economic performances of the Czech and Slovak Republics
and, as a result, it has made policy coordination more difficult and costly for both members of
the clearing union. Moreover, benefits of the exchange-rate system linked with the currency
union have been reduced further. Consequently, policy coordination under the present
exchange-rate system would be less beneficial than it would have been within the currency
union. Also, it is not realistic to expect the recently established republics to ease policy
coordination (specifically, by developing fiscal transfer system).
On the other hand,  the present system provides for  the Czech and Slovak Republics
more independent economic tools. Consequently, since both republics have started exploiting
them, potential costs of the exchange-rate system have been reduced. These results imply that
the exchange-rate system allowing for monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies to differ is
superior to solutions requiring closer policy coordination.  
Our main conclusion is that the future Czech-Slovak exchange-rate system should be
characterized by flexibility. While  attempts to fix the Kc/Sk exchange rate would evoke the
problem of policy coordination again, the exchange-rate systems based on the exchange rate E1
would be less costly since this rate is characterized by a lower degree of fixity. Moreover, a stable
fixed rate would require more information about the Kc/Sk relative price which has not been
found yet.
The second conclusion is that monetary, fiscal, exchange-rate and commercial policies of
both republics are not likely to converge in the medium run. Specifically, fiscal and exchange-rate
policies have already started to diverge. The further divergence is likely and also the difference in
monetary and commercial policies will probably affect the system. As a result, the gaps among
the four Kc/Sk available exchange-rates will be expanded. Since the clearing union does not
protect its members from destabilizing speculations the costs of which will be increasing with
every policy response to the asymmetric problems, the present exchange-rate system calls for
improvements. 
4546Section II: Modifying Present System - 
  Policy Recommendations 
1.  Introduction
The beginning of the year 1994 brings an opportunity to reform the
exchange-rate system between The Czech and Slovak Republics with respect to the
1993 experience. There are two possible approaches to the further reform.
The first one is to continue with the clearing union which allows for converting
a domestic currency of either member country into goods of the other member
country and to modify the present system gradually. The second approach is to
abandon the clearing mechanism completely and to use direct payments in
convertible currencies instead. In this case, the Czech-Slovak transactions would be
suddenly restricted by a necessity to convert domestic currencies into one of the
convertible currencies in order to complete transactions.   
The following subsection (Clearing Mechanism Versus Direct Payments)
attempts to compare these two approaches considering the interdependence of both
countries and the nature of asymmetry of the system. Since this analysis suggests
that  a system of direct payments is not superior to a clearing union in the short-run,
47the last subsection (Toward a Single Rate) discusses the "modification" approach
and examines what  modifications would improve the present system. 
We will conclude that the present clearing union constructs a multiple-rate
system. Consequently, it should be reformed toward a single rate system in order to
prevent destabilizing speculations that reduce benefits of a clearing mechanism by
absorbing foreign reserves and by increasing imbalances of clearing payments.  The
modified clearing system would accomplish the main function-to provide for the
Czech and Slovak Republics a mechanism allowing for making large volumes of
inter-republic payments when economizing on foreign reserves.  
2.  Clearing Mechanism Versus Direct Payments
This subsection classifies under what circumstances it would  be beneficial to
abolish the clearing mechanism and use direct payments in convertible currencies.
How do these alternatives differ? Let us denote the volume of the Czech payments
by CP [ECU] and the volume of the Slovak payments by SP [ECU] for a given
month. On the one hand, the alternative with a clearing mechanism implies following
facts:
(i) both CNB and NBS are avoiding the circulation of their foreign reserves at
the scale: CP+SP [ECU] (assuming that all payments are settled through a clearing
mechanism); if the imbalance exceeds the limit of 130 mil. ECU, they economize at
a scale of 2*min (CP,SP) [ECU] since a debtor settles deficit;   
(ii) a country with lower volumes of payments provides a credit of abs
(CP-SP) [ECU] to the other member country and the credit tends to increase deficit
of this country's government;  
(iii) a country with a clearing deficit will settle the difference greater than
130 mil. ECU in the end of the month otherwise its payments are postponed and it
improves the government's budget. 
On the other hand, a regime of direct payments would increase a monthly
circulation of foreign reserves in both countries at a scale of (CP+SP) [ECU]. This
alternative would be a superior solution if there are no constraints to increased
48demand for foreign currencies in either member country or if consequences of
constrained Czech-Slovak transactions are less costly than consequences of
maintaining the clearing mechanism.
We will consider three factors that are possible to make a clearing
mechanism costly: a decreasing size of clearing payments relatively to foreign
reserves, a permanent clearing imbalance lower than the limit and a clearing
imbalance permanently exceeding the limit. Potential costs caused by these factors
may be still outweighed by  costs of a regime of direct payments which is likely to
cause a rapid significant fall in the Czech-Slovak transactions and to increase a
riskiness of payments. Although the present system is a multiple-rate system, the
costs of destabilizing speculations are not considered as costs of a clearing
mechanism and they are analyzed in the following subsection.
As our previous description suggests, the larger the total volumes of
payments are with respect to the level of foreign reserves, the more beneficial a
clearing mechanism is. Table II.1. indicates that since the volumes of clearing
payments are relatively large, the benefit of economizing on foreign reserves is not
insignificant.









(% of Sl. Foreign
Reserves)
Cz. Payments
(% of Cz. Foreign
Reserves)
2 6.99           7.37             59 %             38 %
3 9.61           9.4           143 %             27 %
4 8.38           9.22           211 %             20 %
5 8.85           8.5           264 %             15 %
6 8.65           8.05           119 %             13 %
7 8.12         10.52               -             15 %
8
(1 - 18)
5.84           3.92               -               5 %
    Data Source: CNB.
Also, it is obvious that this gain is asymmetric because Slovak payments
relative to foreign reserves are much larger than for the Czech Republic. 
49Consequently, Slovak payments would be more constrained and uncertain if a
clearing mechanism was cancelled. 
According to this criterion, members of a clearing union would prefer to use
direct payments after clearing payments become relatively small. The weight of total
Czech and Slovak clearing payments may diminish for different reasons. First, the
disintegration process would continue further causing all the Czech-Slovak
transactions to fall in the medium run. For example, the inter-republic debts would
be settled and inefficient Czech-Slovak transactions would be removed but not
replaced by efficient cooperation. Also, increasing foreign reserves of both members
of a clearing union would lower benefits of a clearing mechanism.
Second, with a narrowed category of clearing transactions the volume of
payments would  be lowered immediately. From this respect, a clearing mechanism
for trade transactions is not superior to a present system. 
As a result, since the volumes of clearing payments are likely to be relatively
large with respect to the level of foreign reserves (at least for one member of a
clearing union), the abolishment of a clearing mechanism would not improve the
Czech-Slovak exchange-rate system in the medium run. 
It is probable that the system will be asymmetric in the sense that  the  gain of
economizing on foreign reserves will be more important for the Slovak Republic.
Without a clearing mechanism, the Slovak Republic may respond to the "shortage"
constraint by either reducing its purchases or by postponing payments.
Consequently, a fall of Czech export to Slovakia would follow and the Slovak
payments would become more uncertain.   
Benefits of a clearing union may be reduced also by the large and permanent
imbalance of clearing payments. The large and permanent deficit lower than the
ECU limit affects the structure of the reserves of both central banks. Specifically, a
creditor has blocked a part of the domestic reserves (since government deficit is
increased) instead of receiving the payments in ECU. Table II.2. shows that Slovakia
has been in the position of creditor since February 1993. The permanent Czech
clearing deficit has not exceeded the ECU limit. However, given the level of the
Slovak foreign reserves, the imbalance is significant. A deficit converging to the limit
would probably be costly for Slovakia. It is possible to reduce this risk by lowering  
the  limit (130 mil. of ECU). 





(% of Cz. Foreign
Reserves
Deficit





2 0.37 1.94 %            3.19 %         8.48 %
3 0.17 0.48 %            2.50 %         3.81 %
4           1.00 2.15 %          25.25 %       22.72 %
5 0.65 1.16 %          19.24 %       14.63 %
6 0.05 0.07 %            0.64 %         1.06 %
7 2.45 3.54 %               -       55.43 %
8 0.52 0.67 %               -       11.82 %
      Data Source: CNB.
Table II.2. also suggests that with the Czech Republic as a creditor, costs of
the clearing union would not be increased given the level of the Czech foreign
reserves. However, the Slovak permanent deficit might affect the Czech
government's budget. Again, it is possible to reduce this risk by lowering the limit.
From this respect, the monthly settlement period would improve the clearing
mechanism.
A clearing mechanism may also be burdened with an imbalance often
exceeding the ECU limit. If an imbalance is caused by a fall in payments of a
creditor (when a creditor does not use a clearing mechanism for some reasons) and,
as a result, a debtor does not economize on its foreign reserves  then members of a
clearing union are indifferent between a clearing mechanism and a regime of direct
payments. However, with a creditor exploiting a clearing mechanism (a clearing
deficit exceeds the ECU limit but is relatively small with respect to volumes of
payments) and with a debtor constrained by a shortage of foreign reserves, a
clearing union would be superior to a regime of direct payments. It reduces riskiness
of the exchange-rate system allowing for a debtor to economize on reserves to some
extent. In a regime of direct payments, a debtor's payments would fall reduced by a
shortage of foreign reserves. As a result, a debtor would decrease purchases and
postpone payments. 
Table II.3. indicates that the cumulative Czech deficit is relatively small with
respect to the volumes of payments. It also demonstrates that a deficit exceeding
51the ECU limit would be relatively large (it also supports the idea that a lower limit or a
monthly settled deficit would improve the system).   
In summary, under conditions that a clearing account exhibits the permanent
and large Czech deficit and the Czech foreign reserves are stable, the abolishment
of a clearing mechanism would not deteriorate the system. On the contrary, the
permanent Slovak deficit, instability of the Slovak foreign reserves and
non-decreasing volumes of payments would favour a clearing mechanism.  














as % of Total
Czech
Payments
2         5.36 %         5.09 % 65 %            62 %
3         1.75 %         1.79 % 47 %            48 %
4       11.98 %       10.89 % 54 %            49 %
5         7.30 %         7.61 % 51 %            54 %
6         0.54 %         0.58 % 53 %            57 %
7       30.18 %       23.29 % 56 %            43 %
8
(1 - 18)
        8.94 %       13.34 % 78 %          116 %
      Data Source: CNB.
The first section demonstrates that there are factors present in the system
which will tend to increase the Slovak deficit  in the medium run. Hence the Slovak
permanent deficit is more likely to burden the system
12. Specifically, a further
increased asymmetry in convertibility of the Czech and Slovak crowns would
increase Slovak clearing payments since the clearing mechanism would allow for
easier exchanges of the Slovak crowns for goods (and for convertible currencies).
Also, the overvalued Slovak crown may burden the system causing the Czech
payments to fall, the Slovak payments to increase and the Slovak foreign reserves to
oscillate. Similarly, the clearing overvaluation of the Slovak crown on the old account
tends to enlarge the Slovak clearing deficit.
12 There is still the Slovak debt unsettled (greater than twenty billion of crowns) from
the end of 1992 which also sharpens the asymmetry of the clearing system in this direction.
52It is possible to eliminate a likelihood of this type of imbalance by restricting a
category of clearing transactions to trade transactions only. However, this
modification may be more restrictive for Slovakia. Since the volumes of Slovak
payments seem to correspond to the volumes of imports, it would reduce Slovak
imports when equalizing volumes of payments (Czech exports to Slovakia tend to
exceed Slovak exports to the Czech Republic). In other words, it is possible for
Slovakia to have a permanent trade deficit with the Czech Republic with all
transactions (transfers, transits, investments) incorporated into the system. The
reduction of a category of clearing transactions would improve the system only if
capital transactions were enlarging the imbalance of clearing transactions
13.   
Also, the problem of the Slovak permanent deficit can be eliminated by other
modifications of the present system (cancelling the old account) and by an
one-sided fall in payments caused by different types of restrictions. Specifically,
Slovakia is likely to use commercial policies (import tariff) to improve the Slovak
current account balance. The Czech Republic seems to be a potential permanent
clearing debtor in the medium run if these restrictions are significant and it would
reduce benefits of a clearing mechanism.
In summary, this subsection concludes that a regime of direct payments is
not superior to a clearing union in the short run. The volumes of payments have not
been falling, the deficit has not been exceeding the ECU limit and the level of foreign
reserves of one member of the union has not been stable. Moreover, the system
may be affected by future asymmetric performances of both union members in a
way increasing costs of a regime of direct payments.
In the medium run, under some circumstances (rapid disintegration, Slovak
trade restrictions at a large scale), the above-suggested indicators (falling volumes
of payments, the Czech clearing deficit is relatively large with respect to the level of
Slovak reserves, the Czech foreign reserves are stable) would signal that a regime
of direct payments is superior to a clearing mechanism. Although it is difficult to
predict what is the long-run trend, the fact that a current change to a regime of direct
payments would probably constrain a level of the Czech-Slovak transactions and
13 CNB has announced that the Czech crown will be fully convertible in 1995. With one
currency fully convertible, it will become necessary to narrow the category of clearing
transactions (at least to current transactions) in order to prevent capital flights which would
destabilize the system. In that case, clearing payments might be settled in Czech crowns.
53increase a riskiness of Slovak payments favour maintaining of a clearing mechanism
in the Czech-Slovak exchange-rate system.
3.  Toward a Single Rate
The first section concludes that since monetary, fiscal, exchange-rate and
commercial policies of both republics will differ in the future, the increasing gaps
among the Kc/Sk available exchange-rates will open a room for destabilizing
speculations. Consequently, the present system will be more and more burdened
with negative consequences of a multiple-rate system. There are two sources that
expand the gaps among rates. First, changes in the compound exchange rate E1
(revaluation/devaluation of the Czech/Slovak crown) make the existence of two
clearing accounts costly. Second, the clearing revaluation/devaluation used to
protect export competitiveness of either member country or to balance payments
expands the gap between the clearing rate E2 and the exchange rate E1.
Let us consider the problem of two accounts first. In July, a room for speculations
was opened by the devaluation of the Slovak crown (Figure II.1.). 










      Data Source: CNB.
It is likely that other factors expanding the exchange-rate differences will
appear in the system. Specifically, the greater the devaluation of the Slovak crown
will be (fall of  E1), the more profitable it will be to use the old clearing account rate to
exchange Slovak crowns for Czech crowns since  the other available rates will be
less generous (E1 < E3 , E2 < E3). Similarly, a tariff imposed on Slovak imports (t < 0)
will expand the difference between the old-account rate E3 and the exchange rate E1
followed by the clearing account rate E2. Also, with restricted supply of foreign
currencies in Slovakia (foreign currencies are not available at price Sk/ECU), the
exchange of the Slovak crowns for convertible currencies through the clearing
mechanism will be more profitable.
Figure II.2. shows that the amount of Slovak payments is increasing relatively
to the amount of Czech payments on the old account. This trend is probably caused
by longer lags in payments of Slovak firms as well as by speculations the weigh of
which is confirmed by fact that after a devaluation of the Slovak crown, the share of
Slovak payments increased rapidly from 68 % in July to 95 % in the first half of
August.












      Data Source: CNB. Data available only until August, 18 for both clearing
     accounts.














      Data Source: CNB
In comparison with the old account, as figure II.3. suggests, the structure of
payments on the new account has not been changed as dramatically using the
exchange rate E2.
Without a well-developed monitoring system, it is possible to avoid the
clearing mechanism by moving Slovak payments to more profitable category of the
old-account transactions or even to speculate by circulations of payments within the
dual-rate clearing system
14.
14 If a Slovak firm pays 1 million of Sk to settle its debts using the old account, its Czech
partner receives 1 million of Kc since the exchange rate is E3. It is possible for the Slovak
firm to require reimbursement (for example when the transaction was settled incorrectly).
56If the amount of speculations increases, the clearing system may be
destabilized. Firstly, the mechanism avoidance (at a large scale) would create the
Slovak deficit on the old account. The net Slovak deficit would be created and would
cause a direct loss of the Slovak foreign reserves when settled in ECU. Also, the
riskiness of the system would be increased since an indirect loss of the Czech
foreign reserves may follow if the system is burdened with an excess shortage of
Slovak foreign reserves.
  Secondly, circular payments (at a large scale) would increase the Czech
deficit on the new account and would create the Slovak deficit on the old account.
The net Czech deficit would be increased and would cause a direct loss of the
Czech foreign reserves when settled in ECU.
On the one hand, it would be possible to develop a monitoring system to
prevent destabilizing speculations. It might be costly with respect to the amount of
clearing transactions as well as to the expected temporality of a clearing mechanism
(For example, it would be difficult to monitor re-export transactions.). On the other
hand, it is possible to prevent costs of speculations by adding the old account to the
new account. Moreover, as the evolution of the old clearing account suggests, it
would not reduce the benefits of the clearing mechanism significantly.
Forces of stability provided by the old account have been decreasing since
the inter-republic debts have been settled gradually since January 1993 and the
current transactions are being settled through the new account
15. Figure II.4.
supports this statement showing that a share of clearing payments using the old
account in the total volume of clearing payments is falling.
When returning this payment through the new account, the Czech firm pays 1 million of Kc
and its Slovak partner receives 1.1 million of Sk since the exchange rate is E2. Net profit of
this transactions is 100,000 Sk.
15 The inter-republic debts that have not been settled yet are not likely to be settled in the
near future. Consequently, their settlements will not exploit advantages of the old account.












After adding the old account to the new one, a standard bilateral clearing
system would be established allowing  for both members to make large volumes of
inter-republic payments when economizing on foreign reserves. This is an extremely
important gain since capital markets are thin in both republics, the foreign reserves
of both members are not stable and the Czech-Slovak interdependence is relatively
high. 
The second problem discussed in this subsection is whether or not the
clearing revaluation/devaluation of the Czech crown should be used as an economic
tool.
The clearing devaluation of the Czech crown has been suggested as an
economic tool protecting a competitiveness of Czech export. However, there are
serious reasons for the clearing rate to follow the exchange rate E1.
On the one hand, it is obvious that a clearing system itself protects both
members from a fall in the Czech-Slovak transactions by cushioning them from
instability caused by a shortage of foreign reserves. On the other hand, this
instability may be increased by using the exchange rate E2 for clearing transactions.
Moreover, the difference between E1 and E2 does not necessarily imply a price
stability gain.
58If the Czech crown is devalued ( > 0) to cancel the effect of  the devaluation
of the Slovak crown (or an import tariff), the gap between the exchange rates E2  and
E1  will be expanded allowing for exchanges of Slovak crowns at a lower rate than
the official Sk/ECU exchange rate is
16. It is important to emphasize  the main
conclusion of the cost-benefit analysis. The divergence in the monetary, fiscal and
exchange-rate policies which is likely to influence the system would not allow for the
exchange rate E1 to converge to E2. Consequently, with the clearing rate not
converging to the long-run equilibrium rate, the significant stability would not be
gained.
The divergence of exchange rates would cause the profitability of the
exchange of the Slovak crowns for goods and convertible currencies through the
clearing mechanism to increase
17. Analogously to the analysis of the costs of the old
account, an increasing amount of speculations would either destabilize the system
or evoke the problem of monitoring.  
With exchanges through the clearing, the Czech Republic's foreign reserves
may be indirectly affected, since these exchanges would increase the amount of
payments going from Slovakia to the Czech Republic. Consequently, CNB would
credit Slovak purchases and it is more probable that the Slovak deficit would exceed
the limit of 130 mil. ECU. It may be difficult to settle this deficit for Slovakia given the
foreign reserves situation.
The situation might be worsen by fact that the exchange rate E2  affects all the
clearing transactions making the Czech payments (including transits, transfers and
capital account transactions) to Slovakia more expensive. This would create a
pressure on the Czech foreign reserves since  the Czech physical and legal persons
would prefer the regime of direct payments to the clearing regime. As a result, the
volumes of the Czech clearing payments might fall increasing the Slovak deficit
further. Consequently, with E2 > E1, Czech export to Slovakia might be restricted by a
16 Instead of receiving E1*ECU/Kc [ECU], it is possible to get (1 +  E 1*ECU/Kc
[ECU] when using the clearing mechanism.
17 Since it is difficult to monitor re-export transactions, Slovak firms pay for goods and
services imported from third countries through the clearing system. According to the
Czech-Slovak trade balance reported by the Czech Statistical Office and the Slovak Statistical
Office, the size of re-exports exceeds six billion of crowns.
59shortage of the Slovak foreign reserves more than by a devaluation of the Slovak
crown.  
As we showed, the amount of the Czech-Slovak trade has been falling for
different reasons and, as a result, the sensitivity of the problem of the Czech export
competitiveness has increased. However, since only the real revaluation of the
Czech crown would decrease the Czech export competitiveness, the Slovak crown
devaluation has not necessarily caused an additional fall in the Czech GDP. The
expected inflation asymmetry suggests that not only prices of imported goods will
raise in Slovakia. On the contrary, the Czech-Slovak interdependence might allow a
transmission of inflation to the Czech Republic through imported Slovak goods and
services.
The clearing revaluation of the Czech crown has been proposed  as the only
available tool which would equalize the Czech and Slovak payments in the case of a
large permanent Slovak deficit. It would increase the Czech purchases in Slovakia
and reduce the Slovak purchases in the Czech Republic. However, there are several
consequences of the clearing revaluation which may reduce benefits of the clearing
more than the Slovak deficit itself. Again, it supports the idea of using the E1  
exchange rate as the clearing rate.
First, if the clearing deficit is settled by a debtor  from other sources (such like
trade surplus with other country or official loans), payments need not necessarily to
be equalized. Second, the equalization of payments in the case of a large
permanent deficit may require the revaluation at a large scale since the payments
may not be very sensitive. Consequently, Czech export would be restricted and the
main benefit of the clearing union - a non falling trade would be reduced. Third, the
clearing revaluation is more likely to slow down the Slovak payments than to reduce
them. The payments will be postponed until the clearing deficit diminishes and the
Czech crown is devalued on the clearing. 
With a large revaluation, the benefit of economizing on the Slovak foreign
reserves would be reduced for following reason. The economic agents would switch
into the regime of direct payments when importing to Slovakia and they would try to
switch into the clearing regime when re-exporting into the Czech Republic through
Slovakia. Also, without monitoring, it would be possible to export goods imported
60from Slovakia into third countries. Consequently, the Slovak deficit may even be
absorbed at the cost of an increase of the Czech money supply.
In summary, by adding the old clearing account to the new one and by using
the exchange rate E1  as a clearing rate, the present system would be improved. It
would accomplish the most important objective - to prevent a large fall in the
Czech-Slovak transactions and it would protect both members from consequences
of a multiple-rate system. 
4.  Conclusions
Our main conclusion is that a gradually modified clearing mechanism is
superior to a regime of direct payments. A current sudden abolishment of a clearing
mechanism would restrict the Czech-Slovak transactions and increase riskiness of
the system. 
The clearing mechanism is beneficial due to the non-decreasing volumes of
payments between the Czech and Slovak Republics. Also, the nature of expected
asymmetry of the system suggests that the clearing union is less costly than direct
payments in the short run since the system is burdened with a shortage of foreign
reserves. A clearing mechanism guarantees in some sense that the Slovak
purchases will not fall below the level of Czech payments. 
Benefits of a clearing mechanism are possible to be reduced in the medium
run. Specifically, falling volumes of payments relatively to the level of foreign
reserves would favour a regime of direct payments.
The second conclusion is that the present clearing mechanism would be
improved by adding the old clearing account to the new one and by using the
exchange rate E1  as a clearing rate. This modification would protect both members
of the clearing union from the increasing costs of a multiple-rate system and would
result into a standard bilateral clearing mechanism. The analysis also shows that a
lower limit or monthly settlement period may be an improvement as well. In this way
modified clearing mechanism would accomplish the most important objective - to
avoid costs of a large sudden fall in the Czech-Slovak transactions.  
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